The year 2020 has been a critical one for Europe: the COVID-19 pandemic and its economic repercussions served as an ultimate test for EU’s solidarity, while Brexit dealt a big blow to EU’s legitimacy and raison d’être. On the bright side, North Macedonia and Albania made a major leap forward by starting EU accession talks after several years of standstill in enlargement policy. Their unwavering determination to join the Union proved that for the countries in the Western Balkans, the EU remains a strategic choice and a role model to follow in the process of societal reform and modernisation.

While the transformation needed to align with EU values and acquis is by no means an easy one, what is even more difficult for the Western Balkans is to overcome bilateral tensions among themselves and with EU member states, which bring along the risk to postpone EU accession indefinitely. While the EU lacks specific mechanisms to adjudicate bilateral disputes, it can offer a framework for dispute resolution on the basis of shared heritage and prospects for a joint future. At the member state level, it can also provide a number of examples of contested history, tested solutions and lessons learnt, some of which could serve as guidance for the Western Balkans to overcome their internal tensions as well as disputes with neighbouring EU member states.

The essence of the European peace project

In 2012, the EU was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for its stabilising role “in transforming most of Europe from a continent of war to a continent of peace”. Being built on the ashes of World War II, the creation of the EU was based on the premise that only profound economic interconnectedness could prevent countries from waging war at each other. The French dependence on German coal and the German dependence on French steel developed into an all-encompassing cooperation which serves as the main driver of European integration today. It also contributed to put an end to French and German hegemonic ambitions and led to gradual rapprochement between the people, on the basis of shared interests and values. The Franco-German friendship was reinforced with the Elysee Treaty signed in 1963 which stipulated that national leaders should meet at regular intervals and coordinate on matters related to foreign, security and defence policy. 40 years later, joint history textbooks were prepared teaching French and German students identical content.

The year 2020 has been a critical one for Europe: the COVID-19 pandemic and its economic repercussions served as an ultimate test for EU’s solidarity, while Brexit dealt a big blow to EU’s legitimacy and raison d’être. On the bright side, North Macedonia and Albania made a major leap forward by starting EU accession talks after several years of standstill in enlargement policy. Their unwavering determination to join the Union proved that for the countries in the Western Balkans, the EU remains a strategic choice and a role model to follow in the process of societal reform and modernisation.

While the transformation needed to align with EU values and acquis is by no means an easy one, what is even more difficult for the Western Balkans is to overcome bilateral tensions among themselves and with EU member states, which bring along the risk to postpone EU accession indefinitely. While the EU lacks specific mechanisms to adjudicate bilateral disputes, it can offer a framework for dispute resolution on the basis of shared heritage and prospects for a joint future. At the member state level, it can also provide a number of examples of contested history, tested solutions and lessons learnt, some of which could serve as guidance for the Western Balkans to overcome their internal tensions as well as disputes with neighbouring EU member states.

The essence of the European peace project

In 2012, the EU was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for its stabilising role “in transforming most of Europe from a continent of war to a continent of peace”. Being built on the ashes of World War II, the creation of the EU was based on the premise that only profound economic interconnectedness could prevent countries from waging war at each other. The French dependence on German coal and the German dependence on French steel developed into an all-encompassing cooperation which serves as the main driver of European integration today. It also contributed to put an end to French and German hegemonic ambitions and led to gradual rapprochement between the people, on the basis of shared interests and values. The Franco-German friendship was reinforced with the Elysee Treaty signed in 1963 which stipulated that national leaders should meet at regular intervals and coordinate on matters related to foreign, security and defence policy. 40 years later, joint history textbooks were prepared teaching French and German students identical content.

While being the most prominent, Franco-German reconciliation is not the only case which proves that the appeal to work together in the spirit of European values and mutual benefit is superior to the philosophy of nationalism and the narrow-minded pursuit of domestic political success. Polish-German reconciliation which took almost half a century to happen is another example that the legacies of war and suffering could be overcome when the future is at stake. While the fall of the Iron Curtain certainly contributed to a more favourable geopolitical landscape, burgeoning activities of civil society groups, the constructive role of the Catholic Church and continuous remorse expressed by German leaders were crucial to bring the people of both countries closer together as a key milestone for the subsequent EU enlargement toward Central and Eastern Europe.

The EU has also played a major role in the Northern Ireland Peace Process by providing a neutral setting for dialogue in the European Parliament, a framework for the Irish identity to develop in a broader European context and financial support to ensure sustainability of the peace agreement. This proves EU’s strong potential to act as an honest broker between its member states, as opposed to situations involving an EU member state and a third country. This can also be supported by the example of the Cypriot issue and the impossibility to reach a solution over the island which Southern part is a part of the EU, while Northern Cyprus does not have a recognised international status. However, since the failure to resolve the bilateral dispute between Slovenia and Croatia on the Gulf of Piran, which eventually became an intra-EU issue after Croatia’s accession, the EU has adopted a stance that an acceding country should resolve all bilateral issues before it joins. Given the voting rules in the EU’s Council of Ministers which require unanimity on matters pertaining to enlargement, such a position provides any member state with the possibility to block any candidate country from making progress toward membership, even if it is in EU’s strategic interest.

The Western Balkans – litmus test for EU’s ability to export peace, stability and prosperity

Recurrent tensions between North Macedonia and Bulgaria, Greece and Albania, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Kosovo etc. are not centuries-old enmities profoundly anchored in their citizens’ mindset. To the contrary, they are the product of the painful Yugoslav dissolution process, new independent countries’ state-building efforts, the quest for own national identity and minority rights, toppled with rising nationalism and irresponsible domestic politics as by-products. Not all the countries have fought wars among themselves, but even those with traditionally good people to people relations often seem to seek and emphasise issues that divide them and bear the potential for disagreement. In a region like the Western Balkans, torn across many lines – national, ethnic, religious, social, linguistic – the EU integration process as endgame is the “glue” which keeps the patchwork together. However, past conflicts and recurrent tensions perpetuate the region’s vulnerabilities, alienate the countries from their EU perspective and hold the potential to export instability toward neighbouring EU member states.

In the past couple of years, North Macedonia made the spotlight as a country which managed to resolve all outstanding issues with the neighbours by signing two international agreements: the Prespa Agreement with Greece, putting an end to the three-decade long name dispute and the Treaty on Friendship, Good-neighbourliness and Cooperation with Bulgaria. The Europe-wide praise of North Macedonia’s good will and efforts to overcome all the obstacles to EU membership seemed to create momentum for all the governments in the region to invest more efforts and resolve mutual contentions, especially raising the expectations about the Serbia-Kosovo issue.

"Their unwavering determination to join the Union proved that for Western Balkans countries the EU remains a strategic choice"

However, Bulgaria’s recent veto on the adoption of the negotiation framework for North Macedonia’s EU accession talks and the opening of the first intergovernmental conference, because its additional demands were not met regarding Macedonian language, joint history and minority issues, showcases the fragility of the hard-won agreements and the looming risk for North Macedonia to go back to the 10-year long status-quo in its EU integration. At the same time, what is often overlooked is the negative effect that the failure of such agreements could have on the other countries in the region: the non-EU member states may lose any incentive to compromise in order to join the EU, while the EU member states may continue the practice of adding unrelated and unrealistic conditions for EU accession, further undermining EU’s enlargement policy as both core value and strategic tool for upholding rule of law, human rights and good governance in the Western Balkans.

The way forward – is there a unique European model?

However, the risk for bilateral agreements to fail does not apply to the Western Balkans only. Since the last change of government in Poland, there have been repeated calls by Polish government officials for Germany to pay war reparations, which undoubtedly resonate with a part of the population. Brexit and the recent refutation of some terms in the exit agreement by the British government raise doubts about the sustainability of the Northern Ireland peace process. On the other hand, one potential solution for the bilateral dispute between Slovenia and Croatia would be to bring the issue in front of the European Court of Justice or the European Commission. Given the precedence of EU legislation and courts over the national level, these recent events open the possibility that maybe the EU institutions could be a more efficient actor in the resolution of bilateral issues between member states, than in cases involving third countries. Such a scenario would increase the likelihood that the Western Balkans will join the EU as soon as they are objectively ready and strengthen EU’s credibility and influence in the region.

When comparing the above-mentioned bilateral agreements, six elements can be identified which underpin the long-lasting success of the Franco-German reconciliation vis-à-vis the others:

1. the conscientious attitude by national leaders who acknowledge their responsibility not to allow the atrocities to be repeated ever again;
2. the high level of awareness that renewal of continued conflict could cause utmost harm to both sides, while closer cooperation spurs economic development;
3. the desire to maintain and strengthen the bilateral relationship through open, franc and result-driven approach in discussing contentious issues;
4. the unconditional support by the international community, namely the USA at the time, both political and financial;
5. the necessity to follow a particular order in the reconciliation in which the rationality of economic interdependence and cooperation precedes the emotionality of political and human rapprochement;
6. the straightforward approach to domestic audiences, freed by the desire to score domestic political points on such delicate matters.

In such a context, there are a number of actions that the EU could undertake to facilitate the resolution of bilateral disputes at its borders:

1. call to responsibility both its member states and candidate countries to put EU core interests and values before national politicking;
2. emphasise the need to respect international law and EU values and openly pinpoint cases of violation, regardless of the state that commits them;
3. encourage and support effective mediation by independent bodies;
4. in line with its current internal debate on “strategic autonomy”, to acknowledge enlargement as both a strategic interest and tool to convey its values on a broader scale and move from unanimity to qualified majority voting.

At the same time, Western Balkans and EU member states involved in bilateral disputes should:

1. embrace the culture of compromise which is inherent in EU-level policy making;
2. refrain from the use of populist rhetoric on bilateral issues to score domestic political points;
3. actively promote the shared heritage and commonalities that unite their people in neighbouring countries, instead of the divisive points.

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The article is produced within the framework of the project “Shared or contested heritage”, implemented by ALDA Skopje and Forum ZFD. The aim of the project is to improve cross-border cooperation between North Macedonia, Greece and Bulgaria. The project raises awareness of the role of contested histories and shared cultural heritage for the EU integration processes among heritage practitioners and cultural workers. The content of the article is the sole responsibility of the author and does not always reflect the views and attitudes of ALDA and Forum ZFD